Phenomenology of Anomaluos Causality by Ibrulj, Nijaz
Afterword
nijaz Ibrulj 
Phenomenology of  
Anomalous causality
Sociology is a more advanced science than is ordinarily believed, even among so-
ciologists. Perhaps a good criterion of the position of a social scientist in his or her 
discipline might be how high his idea is of what he must master in order to be abreast 
of the achievements of his science. The propensity to evolve an unpretentious grasp 
of your scientific capabilities cannot but increase as your knowledge of the most re-
cent achievements in matters of method, techniques, concepts or theories, grows. But 
sociology is yet little codified and little formalized.
Pierre Bourdieu, An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology, p. 223
Introduction
Does sociology expand the theoretical knowledge of social phenomena, or 
does it merely codify and formalize repeated social practices explored through 
empirical methods; either way, regardless of whether it deals with social struc-
tures, mechanisms, or mere social actors, the term “sociology” legitimately 
evokes a science of society: a science that reveals the “true logic” and “true 
nature” of that which we call “society”. However, that which (theoretical) 
sociologists truly know— or could and should know about a given society in 
real time and space— cannot be contained in a single universal sociological 
theory or a single general principle that applies to all theoretically and em-
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pirically possible (social) worlds, nor for that matter in a single extensive dis-
cipline derived from such a principle. Only together can social sciences and 
the humanities offer an intensive or fundamental exploration or demarcation 
of human nature,1 and broaden it to an exploration of the general nature of 
human relationships. People continuously create their own (social) relation-
ships, while (social) relationships in turn create them (people). People and 
social relations create people and social relations: a trivial claim responsible 
for the emergence and growth of an entire library of sociology— a never com-
plete collection of theories, paths in sociology, and schools.
What is indeed implicit, or imminently invisible in relations/practices of so-
cial actors/subjects, and how do we make it explicit and visible/knowable in the 
concepts of an acceptable theory? How can we even conceptualize the social 
and cultural content of the lifeworld of individuals, groups, or entire societies, 
and rationalize it despite anomalous social causality and heteronymous intention-
ality, which only partially overlaps with collective intentionality? What is 
the real content and meaning of relations masked in the form of social action 
(hence social relations), and the use of signs and symbols in social communica-
tion and representation?
Sociology is not merely a descriptive science that explicates the outside 
of social phenomena the way it encounters them in real time and space; it is 
simultaneously a science of the normative and prescriptive bases/structures of 
social relations that enable the recurrence of phenomena and states of affairs 
in social practices; in other words, a science of the social norms and sanc-
tions, conventions and rules, semantic stereotypes and symbolic representa-
tions functioning within society. Particular social sciences like sociology, eco-
nomics, law, psychology, communication studies, can be partially understood 
through their external history; their inner connection and unity is revealed 
only through an identification of ontological and epistemological assump-
tions, fundamental or universal logical and semantic relations that endure in 
the forms of existence of the facts with which they deal.
This bipolar status of each social science— the simultaneous parochialism 
and principlism (Brandom 1994/2001: 3) of social phenomena, the state of 
affairs and relations— has led post- modern (post- traditional, post- national, 
post- Marxist, or, according to Jürgen Habermas, post- metaphysical) sociolog-
ical theory, originating in the work of philosophers and sociologists, legis-
lators and economists, writers and artists in both America and Europe, to 
understand socio- cultural relativity as a fluctuating process in the social context, 
as imprecise information about those processes, as an ambiguous vocabulary in 
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which social phenomena, social processes, and the social interactions of peo-
ple are interpreted. Similarly conceived is the need to introduce the pluralistic 
relativity standpoint (methodological consortium) in the study of social reality. 
The new methodological approach and the new epistemological standpoint, which 
mutually constitute (and subsequently homogenize) knowledge of the objects 
of social science, must bear in mind their dynamics in a live context, their 
partiality, and their contamination of possible interactions through various ac-
tive contexts of social actors and through various idioms of identification and 
representation of social phenomena.
In Bosnian social theory, which arose in the wake of the furious aggression 
against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the genocide committed 
against Bosniaks (1992–1995), there emerged a need to reflect upon social 
phenomena from the standpoint of pluralistic epistemologies capable of seeking 
consensuality and innovation in resolving problems and making decisions that 
touch upon identity reflexes, as well as status and collective social functions, 
deontic values, concepts of institutions and institutional facts. Certainly, Ivo 
Komsic, philosopher and sociologist, author of the widely noticed The Social 
Power of Mind (2012), is a thinker with the ability to explore the most com-
plex (variable, imprecise, unstable, dynamic, granulated, particular) layers of 
contingency of modern society and, at the same time, using his philosophical 
background and vocabulary, arrive at the deepest (ontological, structural, fun-
damental) answers to questions of the universal and fundamental existence of 
social processes, facts, and states of affairs.
Numerous Bosnian authors in the social sciences and especially sociology 
are guilty of what is known as hysteron proteron— or where what is last comes 
first. In numerous books they have presented their understanding of B&H re-
ality as true, general, and necessary (universal) understanding, but without 
ever beforehand scientifically determining the methodological position, the 
epistemological and ontological basis of the principles underlying the inter-
pretation of the reality which they dealt with in a descriptive way. Hence, 
a great number of studies fell beneath the dignity of science, even if they 
were not uninteresting as types of narrative, essay writing, and personal views 
based on the “principles” of some “general knowledge”, which in fact produce 
folk- sociology and folk- psychology as the “most certain” pillars of political 
epistemology. However, politics always takes itself as its epistemology, as its 
own system of truths (political or ideological dogma) where justification for its 
own truths is established. So for all who make use of it, it remains its own path 
to its own truths, which is not a scientifically relevant path.
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Ivo Komsic, unlike many of his contemporaries in Bosnian sociology, has 
chosen the more difficult road to explicate his ideas, conceiving his research, 
entitled A Theory of Social Pulsations as a tractatus that transcends/plunges into 
the case study. Thus, he truly resorts to a theory of (the social) world in which 
concepts are homologized from the wholly innovative sociological standpoint of 
the author while simultaneously avoiding theorizing which neglects (social) 
cases, (social) facts, (social) states of affairs, (social) reality. The form of the 
tractatus is exacting because it demands of the author, aside from the homol-
ogization of propositions by turning them into axioms, also their argumenta-
tive granulation into lemmas, theorems, and definitions. However, the case 
study enables entry into the semantics of the concrete and offers material/sensual 
evidence of theoretical utterances. This semantics of the concrete, according 
to Komsic, always functions as an illumination of the contradictory reality of 
Bosnian society.2
A Sociological Tractatus Philosophicus
In social and political ontology, anything that can be explicated— anything 
with its own “invisible” logic, or “real” nature and “real” meaning— can be 
explicated through various strategies: either through the terminology of the 
phenomenology of perception, or through the terms of transformation of the 
conceptual into cognitive content (“from knowledge to understanding” in 
Hegel’s terms, or from “sense to reference” in Frege’s terms), or through the 
terms of conceptual relations, or through terms of deontic or value judgments, 
or through terms of linguistic practices of communication, or through terms 
of causation, or through terms of inductive redescription, re- interpretation, or 
rationalization. Social phenomenology— whose principles were laid down by 
Alfred Schutz by sociologizing the fundamental concepts of Husserl’s phe-
nomenology and Weber’s theory of action, thus creating “the foundations of 
phenomenological sociology” (Schutz 1973: 3)—had from the beginning its 
own notion of the “examination of the social world in its various articula-
tions and forms of organization which constitutes social reality for men living 
within it” (Ibid. 79), as in a “web of social relationships, of systems of signs 
and symbols with their particular structure of reference, of institutionalized 
forms of social organization, of systems of status and prestige, etc.” (Ibid. 80). 
According to Schutz, as a whole man takes this as given, but in fact it is the 
meaning of the elements, which constitute social reality, that is interpreted and 
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communicated with the other as a symbolic exchange of identity (the iden-
tifications and representations which constitute the basis of social relations).
In this sense, Komsic’s approach is synoptic and synergetic: nothing is expli-
cated until everything is explicated through all possible sequences of inductive 
explication of the primary reason or multiply causality of the social world; all 
aspects of the implicit should be explicated synoptically and synchronically on 
various planes of appearance in the building blocks of social ontology as multi-
ply variables of functions that determine one another. Social phenomenology 
must bind together all convergent conceptual blocks of social facticity with 
axioms (whatever these may be) into a single edifice3 or a single thought con-
struct that deals with the reflection of unstable and changeable social reality 
(Giddens’s concept of a runaway world) in an uncertain and unstable manner, 
and whose particular practices are, in spite of everything, rationally and infer-
entially articulated (Brandom’s concept), though not finally (once and for all) 
fixed, which is why they can never be fully complete nor the functions of their 
relations absolutely consistent (“ω— consistent” according to Tarski).
In the work before us, The Theory of Social Pulsation (2015), where a new 
theory from the standpoint of social phenomenology and of philosophy of social 
sciences is presented, Komsic has developed his own approach in explaining 
social phenomena, the actions and interactions of social actors, and proposed 
an authentic conceptual framework for a web of concepts which function in-
teractively within that framework and extend to experiential phenomena and 
background mentalities. Namely, social phenomenology, the implicit basis in 
Komsic’s The Social Power of Mind (2012), is here taken as explicit content 
in his endeavors to articulate a new methodological approach to a general 
social theory. This book deals with a kind of sociological tractatus philosophi-
cus constructed in five theses, or five propositions that have the function of 
“unstable” or “impure” axioms from whose explanation and commentary new 
theorems of an inferential social phenomenology must follow. It must offer a ra-
tionalization and redescription of the anomalous causality of social phenomena; 
or rather, it must render explicit their unstable ontology, which incessantly 
transforms itself within the semantic and structural/institutional relations of 
social actors in real space and time, explicit.
Komsic’s decision to present his theory of social pulsation to the scientific 
world should be seen as an attempt to egress a possible end of sociology as a 
collection of great finished and monolithic sociological theories of the likes 
of Weber, Durkheim, Comte, Marx, Mill, and come up with a starting- point 
for the application of the post- modern pluralistic methodology of reflexive ex-
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plication of the social process (the task of sociologization), which is relative to 
and contingent upon culture, rationalization, type of intentionality, reflec-
tion, the type of rational and communicational competency of social actors, 
but also upon interpretation, interiorization and innovation. In short, it deals 
with processes which depend on multiply functions of inductive variables that 
refer to unstable and ambiguous social processes, as well as unstable axioms by 
means of which the theoretical construction of data, like the temporally deter-
mined knowledge of structure, mechanism, and the function of social facticity, 
is axiomatized. The reflexive explication of action is possible as a rational-
ization and redescription which leads inductive sequences that function as 
co- causal factors.
An additional value that Komsic introduces to social theory (and espe-
cially to sociology) is his drive to find, within the limits of his own interest in 
political epistemology and political ontology, an adequate rationalization of social 
processes, and in particular the processes taking place within Bosnian society. 
He does not see this rationalization in the repetition of inductive/empirical 
sequences and their expansion and accumulation, but rather in the redescrip-
tion of social inferentialism or in the unveiling of the innovative role of the hu-
man mind/rationality that could be realized by collective consciousness if its 
intentionality were led by deontic values as socially recognizable potentials and 
if it were realized through the institutions of a functioning nation or open so-
ciety without enemies/opponents of its existence. In fact, this is an additional 
motive in Komsic’s theoretical and practical concern with social phenome-
na. These forays into the semantics of the concrete, into case studies, into the 
political ontology and political epistemology of Bosnian society, which are 
constant to Komsic’s work, are not an aesthetic ballast to be dispensed with 
from the theoretical heights of thought abstraction; on the contrary, dealing 
with Bosnian conditions/examples enables strong illumination of social ontology 
that is imprisoned within unresolved contradictions.
Now, in The Theory of Social Pulsation, Komsic analyzes social processes, 
social facts, and social states of affairs through three critical and analytical id-
ioms: one is sociological, communicational, cognitive world of social relations 
determined by collective (“objective”) values and individual (“subjective”) 
capabilities; another is philosophical, profound, that reveals the ontology of 
social phenomena in the contingency of social processes; the third is political, 
contextual, pragmatic, that reveals the logic, or rather political ontology and 
political epistemology of actors who construct ideological systems as “struc-
tures of structures of society,” (Ibrulj 2005) incorporating within them the 
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social actors and their relations. Here, we will test all three critical and ana-
lytical idioms using the instrument of comparative methodology.
In terms of modal logic, it is not impossible to introduce a standpoint of 
comparative methodology to the reception of a possible scientific theory, or rath-
er, in relation to such a layered interpretation and particular methodological 
approach/standpoint to social theory as is presented by Komsic in The Theory 
of Social Pulsation, construct a specific methodological relation or project a 
new logic of reception of this theory. The principle of comparative methodol-
ogy evokes various methodological practices or convergent conceptual strategies, 
and with it ensures the parallel- distributed redescriptions that are indispensable 
to elucidating phenomena that are determined behaviorally, psycho- socially, 
idiomatically, and socio- culturally, which are factually relative, contingent, 
and anomalous, and for which we need to find a “primary reason” (Davidson) 
and understand the difference between formal and material intention.
Likewise, it is not impossible to enter into a projective semantics of social re-
lations through a consortium of methodologies of various sciences, like the analyt-
ic philosophy of the social sciences, cognitive science, and the philosophy of 
natural science itself. This approach to social phenomena, primarily proposed 
by John R. Searle and Anthony Giddens,4 had already been successfully advo-
cated in some prior research published in Bosnia (Ibrulj 2005). It is imperative 
to understand cognitive models and models of language use in the explication 
of social phenomena, as well as models of interpretation of those very models 
of explication, as social. As W.V.O. Quine avers in the first sentence of his 
World and Object: “Language is a social art” (Quine 1960: ix). Searle believes 
that language “constructs social reality,” since it is in fact “essentially consti-
tutive of institutional facts,” (Searle 1997: 5) or rather “language is itself an 
institution” (Ibid. 51). Furthermore, cognitive models of social relations, too, 
are social acts or contextually conditioned reactions of communication and 
interpretation of cause- and- effect relations in social action.
The conceptual framework that emerged in relation to Komsic’s theory 
of social pulsations is composed of notions we will deem convenient in the 
reception of this theory: the anomalous character of social causation, implicit 
normative inferentialism, projective semantics of social relations, projective sociolo-
gy, projective social phenomenology, inferential explication of social relations, social 
inferentialism, and many others. This conceptual framework is part of a “par-
tial doctrine” itself, or a counter- factual position within sociological theory 
that could legitimately be called projective sociology, or connectionistic social 
theory, that is founded on a new projective semantics of social relations. If we 
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are able interpret Komsic’s approach to social theory through the conceptual 
framework presented here, then the evidence of its sustainability lies in the 
constructability of this new conceptual framework, that is in the mapping of 
structures which the two sets of propositions, or claims, produce when and if 
brought into resonance.5
Social Structure vs. Social Actors
In Europe, the development of social theory, especially its classical period in 
the works of Durkheim, Weber, and Marx, was many times cross- fertilized 
under the influence of the American theory of social pragmatism developed 
by John Stewart Mill and John Dewey, social psychology as developed by 
G.H. Mead, and later the effects of social ethnocentrism in the form of the 
pragmatism of Richard Rorty. Its development has simultaneously been in-
fluenced by an ever deepening reflective sociologization of all aspects of social 
and cultural reality via the entry of critical theory: first with Adorno’s efforts to 
consider philosophy as an organon of sociological reflections, then with the 
upgrading of this instrument into a hermeneutic and informal argumentation 
in the work of Habermas and Giddens, and then with the development of so-
ciology in the post- communist era, especially in central and eastern Europe.6 
Gerard Delanty holds that the social sciences at present are a strong “inter- 
disciplinary” and “diffuse field” (Delanty 2006: xix), which has changed the 
self- understanding and character of the modern; he notices that there is a 
trauma of self- understanding in European social theory and in the field of so-
ciology, noticeable in questions of culture, identity, knowledge, science, glo-
balization. The connection of thought with actual processes and actual social 
phenomena produces both an expansion of sociology and an expansion of social 
constructs that eventually become its case studies. For instance, the dramatic 
acceleration of an Adorno- like critical social theory as a philosophization of so-
ciological concepts was supplied by an empirical or factual event: the holocaust 
of European Jewry.
Along the same lines, we can say that the contemporary drama within 
European social theory at the beginning of the new millennium (to which 
the theory which has developed in Bosnia and Herzegovina also belongs) has 
been determined by processes of accelerated enlargement and unification of 
the European Union, as well as the coeval disintegration— both in form and 
content— of existing unions in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, the genocide 
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against Bosniaks in Srebrenica, ethnic cleansing, mass rape, concentration 
camps, and killing as an ethno- national project of national identification and 
politico- geographic representations of people sharing territory in Europe. The 
genocide, which stands at the threshold of Europe’s entry into the new millen-
nium, is the responsibility of both the architects and the ground- technicians, 
both the academics and the killers, but also of all those who are watching and 
approved it from various European centers, not only the Serbian militants 
who carried it out. Twenty years after the pre- meditated genocide, Srebrenica 
already looks like the starting point of a process gripping the entire continent. 
The progressive growth of Islamophobia and xenophobia within Europe is a 
clear omen of a new holocaust.7
The right of an other to exist as different (within a single species) has never 
been more cloaked in negative facticity and negative practice than today. The 
imperialistic campaigns of coalitions led by NATO in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
the “Arab” spring in Egypt and Libya, the perpetual Zionistic aggression and ter-
rorization of people in Palestine, the perfidious terrorist activity of shelling civil 
neighborhoods in Israel undertaken by Hamas and Hezbollah, the creation 
and support of chaos in Syria, the military intervention of Russia in Ukraine, 
the growth of right- wing politics in Europe, of Islamophobia (the PEGIDA move-
ment in Germany) and xenophobia (the program of the Golden Dawn party 
in Greece), the public denunciation of multiculturalism by European chancel-
lors, and, on the other side of the coin, intensifying Islamic ideologies and their 
ideological transfer from the Middle East, followed by terrorist practices across 
Europe and America, the terrorist activities of Al Qaida, frontal Jihad terrorism 
in the name of the so- called Islamic State (projected by the talibanization and 
Islamization of Middle Eastern countries, and even some Balkan states), pro-
cesses which have an impact on the entirety of the Muslim population around 
the world; all this determines the factual and political ontology of global so-
ciety as a continuous chain of cause- and- effect relations of negativity. Factual 
negation of negative facticity is still nowhere in sight, while the theoretical 
looms in the conflict of the left with the policies of neo- liberalism and neo- 
imperialism.8
The growth of aggression conducted by negative facticity and permanent 
drama— associated with ethnic, national, and individual identity— has vastly 
influenced the change in both form and content of social research, the notion 
of social theory and its borders, and especially the role and place of a sociol-
ogy that has long been insufficient in and of itself to explain its own position 
within science, nor the reality it studies.
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Social theory thus occupies an uncertain ground between, on the one hand, the do-
main of a post- disciplinary sociology and on the other an interdisciplinary mode of 
theorizing that is connected to political (what kind of society?) and philosophical 
questions in epistemology (the nature of truth, questions of method and knowledge) 
and ontology (the nature of social reality). In this sense it has a less clear- cut identity 
than the more disciplinary specific endeavours of political theory and sociological 
theory. As a critical social philosophy, social theory concerns reflection on the social 
world in the broadest possible sense of the term (Osborne 1998). It is then probably 
best distinguished from sociological theory in the narrow sense and from the history 
of sociology. It is unavoidably bound up with critical and normative questions. (De-
lanty 2006: xxi)
Every social theory strives to offer a new solution to the problem of relations 
between social structure and subject(s). Social factors affect the behavior of 
individuals and groups— it is the basis for imputing existence to a social struc-
ture that is above the natural and volitional capacity of individuals. Just as 
Marx’s avers that “it is not consciousness of men that determines their being, 
but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness,” 
so too the numerous value- determined theses proposed by Durkheim and We-
ber speak to the epistemological and methodological priority of the social 
over the individual. From Durkheim, through Weber and Marx, to Mead and 
beyond, there is a clearly established potency of the social over the individual.
We have a statement of the human animal as having reached a situation in which he 
gets control over his environment. Now, it is not the human animal as an individual 
that reaches any such climax as that; it is society. This point is cogently insisted upon 
by Hegel, the last of the Romantic idealists. The human animal as an individual 
could never have attained control over the environment. It is a control which has 
arisen through social organization.
The very speech he uses, the very mechanism of thought which is given, are 
social products His own self is attained only through his taking the attitude of the 
social group to which he belongs. He must become socialized to become himself. 
(Mead and Strauss 1956: 16)
The social structure and social subjects, along with their cause- and- effect re-
lationships as well as the conditions under which social change is possible, 
is a vast and longstanding theme of all philosophical and sociological social 
research, from Weber and Durkheim to Marx’s social theory, from critical 
social theory to the linguistic- psychological characterization of these relations 
in the works of Jean Piaget, Jacques Lacan, Jacques Derrida, to those of Peter 
Berger, Thomas Luckmann, G.H. Mead, John Searle, and others. However, 
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this dichotomy collapsed in postmodern pluralistic epistemologies and ethno-
centric methodologies in the theories of socio- cultural relativity, so that the 
post- structuralist determination of the object of social science led to func-
tionalist, constructionist, reflexive, and relational concepts in which scientific 
rigidity within sociology was abandoned for scientific rigor.
The theoretical positions that co- constitute Komsic’s philosophical and 
sociological standpoint in his theory of social pulsation are not assumed un-
critically nor are they formally cited for the purpose of bibliographical no-
tification. They are part of Komsic’s theoretical demarcations and his aban-
donment of the “methodological” vs. “epistemological” division through the 
separation of the empirical from the theoretical in the classification of facts 
and construction of evidence. Komsic believes that the foundation of soci-
ological knowledge is an understanding of the active mechanism produced 
(cause, change, stop, cause again, stop again, etc.) by historical events of so-
cial change. What is it that is active in such a way, and in what way does it 
transfer its activity in space and time?
The complete understanding of the action of an eightfold causality, which 
Komsic introduces into his theory as a matrix of variables of a function that 
could present the real activities of social actors, is of paramount importance 
to understanding the entire theory of social pulsation. Rather, in the contexts 
that explain the action of the aforementioned variables, Komsic performs 
a conceptual demarcation of his theory from the social theories presented by 
Hegel, Marx, Weber, Habermas, and Giddens, among others. Thus, Komsic 
boldly enters into the “battle over the (social) substance,” or rather into the 
clear and established determination of what constitutes the real or true object 
of sociological understanding or social sciences. Of course, this battle is not 
even vaguely won within the social sciences, while changes in the context 
(social change) in which it is waged merely exacerbate disagreements.
These disagreements over the role of social structure are nothing less than a battle 
for the heart and soul of sociology; and indeed of the social sciences more generally, 
since just the same issues arise in any discipline that seeks to examine what happens 
in the social world. The social sciences look completely different through structur-
alist and individualist spectacles. Are they to be concerned with explaining social 
phenomena purely in terms of the contributions of individuals, or are there charac-
teristically social forces that affect social phenomena? (Elder- Vass 2010: 3)
Objectively speaking, it must be said that with Komsic there is now an author 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina who dares outline a new approach to social theory 
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that redefines binary relations: social structure and its nature and social actors 
and their nature. European social thought has already realized that this di-
chotomy must be overcome and abandoned in the name of descriptive roles of 
multiply fuzzy distinctions that are real, with a real impact in the social world.9 
There is not much chance of introducing a new concept into social phenom-
enology that has not already contributed to the development of social theory 
in one way or another, by one author or another, at one time or another. 
Novelty lies in a theoretical standpoint, a beginning that imbues social studies 
with a new perspective on things. Every new scientific standpoint, every new 
beginning of critical thinking, is expressed through a new idea that needs to 
be either developed or explicated by a given method or a given consortium of 
methods.
In Komsic, the interfering concepts (a) social actors, (b) social facts, (c) so-
cial state of affairs, represent a triad that is greater than the sum of its parts, 
namely the triangulation of a conceptually adequate set of elements that he 
takes from his theory of social pulsation. In fact, social pulsation is a com-
pletely new concept in social theory, and the proposition, “Pulsation is a state 
in which we find social actors— individuals, social groups, institutions, sys-
tems. It is an active state”—is a new methodological starting- point, a new 
ontological groundwork in need of a new epistemological theory! It isolates 
the internal properties of all three elements of the triad which emerge as an 
internal cause- and- effect of its synchronized activity in real space and time. 
There is no triangulation— as a structure of social pulsation— until each part 
of the triad is capable of action, capable of social pulsation, and until certain 
types of rationality either precede or follow that action. One type of rational-
ity corresponds to purpose- driven action, while a different one corresponds to 
value- driven action. The consensus- driven action of actors has yet another type 
of rationality, as has innovation- driven action. All this prevents Komsic from 
basing himself on traditional sociology, which utilizes an already established 
fixed structure in relation to social actors and social practices. On the contra-
ry, he follows Mead’s approach on this topic.
Considering social relations and social practices as products of already es-
tablished or determined structures and mechanisms embodied in social roles, 
which then determine the behavior of social actors (the so- called “structural 
conception of human society”), is something altogether different from fore-
grounding the actions of social actors as formative in the development of so-
cial structures and mechanisms. The concept of symbolic interactionism has 
significantly contributed to the critique of traditional structural concepts in 
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sociology. G.H. Mead, in particular, urged a critique of understanding as an 
established system composed of social roles and not of real actions of actors 
and social relations that emerge in various social practices. Mead, by means of 
his symbolic interactionist perspective, refuted the so- called structural conception 
of human society which, according to Herbert Blumer,
views society as established organization, familiar to us in the use of such terms as 
social structure, social system, status position, social role, social stratification, in-
stitutional structure, cultural pattern, social codes, social norms, and social values. 
(Blumer 1969: 74)
By contrast, Mead, without rejecting the existence of structural properties of 
human society, foregrounded the formative actions of social practices pro-
duced by social actors.
Mead’s scheme definitely challenges this conception. It sees human society not as 
an established structure but as people meeting their conditions of life; it sees social 
action not as an emanation of societal structure but as a formation made by human 
actors; it sees this formation of action not as societal factors coming to expression 
through the medium of human organisms but as constructions made by actors out 
of what they take into account; it sees group life not as a release or expression of 
established structure but as a process of building up joint actions; it sees social actions 
as having variable careers and not as confined to the alternatives of conformity to or 
deviation from the dictates of established structure; it sees the so- called interaction 
between parts of a society not as a direct exercising of influence by one part on an-
other but as mediated throughout by interpretations made by people; accordingly, it 
sees society not as a system, whether in the form of a static, moving, or whatever kind 
of equilibrium, but as a vast number of occurring joint actions, many closely linked, 
many not linked at all, many prefigured and repetitious, others being carved out in 
new directions, and all being pursued to serve the purposes of the participants and not 
the requirements of a system. I have said enough, I think, to point out the drastic dif-
ferences between the Meadian conception of society and the widespread sociological 
conceptions of it as a structure. (Ibid. 74–75)
Social pulsations of social actors (social pulsators), or the active social states 
of social actors (social pulsations) of varying intensity, which Komsic discusses 
in his five propositions of theory, do not derive from some abstract concept 
of social structure or some monolithic/phantom notion of society; rather they 
are taken as a characteristic or essential trait that social actors have in actions 
in which only they possess social structural power. These structural powers, 
which reveal themselves in the actions of individuals, groups, societies, insti-
tutions, have cause- and- effect implications that are partially anomalous, or 
102 The Theory of Social PulSaTion
rather, not necessary in the sense of natural causation. Thus, Komsic places 
the causal power of social structures in social actors, and their actions in their 
practices.
The task of sociology, as a general social discipline, is to offer a novel and unique 
theoretical groundwork for understanding social structures and all their given con-
ditions, as well as social activities and all their subjective- value presumptions. This 
understanding, with a distinct theoretical and methodological preposition, would 
avoid the dichotomy of the social structure and social actors, determinations and 
intentionality that (dichotomy) has been burdening sociology from its inception 
till present. True, that same dichotomy enabled a wide development of sociology, 
through its disciplines in both directions, but the problem of that interrelation still 
remains. (Komsic, p. 2)
Implicit Ontology of Social Facticity
Do concepts and terms that describe and explain the social matrix of the life-
world have a purpose and meaning already in themselves or do they acquire 
them only through use, in a context determined by socially symbolic phe-
nomena? Apart from knowledge of the pragmatic nature of human relations, 
the social sciences have an obligation to account for the things they know 
about themselves and the grounds to which they refer. Naturally, they cannot 
accomplish this from within. In fact, the philosophy of the social sciences, and 
the analytic philosophy of the social sciences in particular (Giddens), must render 
explicit what in these sciences is implicit: answer the question of the true nature 
of “that which is social” (social practices), the true nature of what the science 
of society itself examines as a facticity that is constructed historically, natu-
ralistically, psychologically, cognitively, politically, linguistically, and, these 
days, virtually (through information technology). The true nature of social 
practices, whose cognitive, conceptual, and logical- linguistic content fills so-
cial relations, must become accessible through a social phenomenology that 
would have the opportunity to explicate them as rationally justified, semantical-
ly constructible, and inferentially articulated strategies.
In our opinion, the contemporary philosophy of social science needs to con-
struct a projective semantics of social relations that would capture the web of 
interactions of social actors, individuals, groups, societies, and types of con-
texts (“social milieus” according to Blumer) in which they occur. Such a pro-
jective semantics could have the role Robert B. Brandom imagined for the logic 
of inferentialism in the interpretation of linguistic and conceptual practices 
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(Brandom 2001), or perhaps the role of social (status) functions that have 
meaning and significance and show what is “projected in (social) things” and 
“prejudged in (social) relations” (Wittgenstein). Each new approach to the 
construction of a formally and substantively acceptable social theory is again 
analyzed from the standpoint of its originating social context regardless of the 
extent of its impact and application. It is only possible to demonstrate that a 
new social theory has been taken on board when that very theory, by its own 
action, produces a critical reflection in new concepts and new approaches: 
only then does it instigate the process of a new reflection on its “construction 
and reconstruction,” or rather the process of its “redescription” (Davidson 
1984: 105).
Indeed, it is possible to talk about an invisible ontology (Searle’s phrase) 
(Searle 1997: 3) of social facticity made up of relations and states of affairs 
whose existence is objective only because they are produced by man in his be-
ing and acting. Social phenomena, social processes, social states of affairs, and 
social facts, are not God given. Besides, they are neither produced, controlled, 
nor influenced by laws of nature, except incidentally and indirectly. They ap-
pear, disappear, or are repeated only in human activity, in multiplied interaction 
of communication that is ruptured and renewed, that is ever what could (acci-
dentally) happen and not what necessarily, eternally, and unconditionally ex-
ists. An absence of such necessity indicates that the (social) world is all that is 
the (social) case (possibility)—that social facts area social reality only in the 
social world. The use of this term, or the “grammar of the word ‘social’,” clear-
ly indicates that this term is distinctly self- referential and that, paradoxically, 
every definition of this concept must refer back to its (social) content outside 
of which there is no other reference. Besides which, social ontology is unstable 
ontology, and the axiomatization of facts about its structures and phenomena 
is unstable, dialectical, modal, and many- valued.
Thus, it appears that the term “social” is actually without objective ref-
erence! Actually, it might be said: the variable that contains all its values, 
all the meaning of its predicative parts. Some economic process, some legal 
event, some physical or mental content becomes a social fact only when inter-
preted in a web of relations which constitute a social context, and not other-
wise. Even the biological and genetic, gendered and neurological, neuropsy-
chological and cognitive, might cease to be such in an interpretation that 
depends on the subject and its semantic and moral history in which its social 
meaning and social significance is determined. Mead insisted, especially in 
his social psychology, that there needs to be a minimum of the social present 
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in the biological individual if only for the symbols necessary to communicate 
with other members of society, or rather “because the individual himself be-
longs to a social structure, a social order” (Mead 1972: 1).
Thus, “what is in itself social” can neither be thought nor spoken of with-
out referring to “what is social” in each of its exemplifications, in each pos-
sible world, in each of its predicative parts! Something that is “social” is true 
if, and only if, it is social! Analytical philosophy of social science may start 
from (Tarski’s) convention of truth of (social) statements: “Statement ‘X is 
a social phenomenon’ is true if and only if (if it applies! if taken as! if taken 
into account! if it holds! if taken as such!)—that X is a social phenomenon.” 
However, according to Komsic’s synoptic glossary, in order for something to 
be a social phenomenon or social pulsation, it must bear at least eight essential 
characteristics/traits in its concept: it must, (a) be intentional, (b) be reac-
tive, (c) be reflexive, (d) be communicational, (e) be institutionalized, (f) be 
interiorized, (g) be structured, (h) be innovative. So, if we were bold enough 
to propose a function of multiplied social interaction, which embraces a large 
number of variables or semantic projections of varying degrees in the realization 
of the concept- web “social,” then this representation of multiplied generalization 
of social originality must take into account Komsic’s explicative concepts (a– h) 
interlaced in the theory of social pulsation. These concepts are actually a type 
of indexation or discrimination or conceptual demarcation of causality of what is 
and what is not a social phenomena.
Komsic has produced an interesting and, in a theoretical sense, functional 
web of concepts which he applies to the conceptualization of society per-
ceived as lifeworld, which is sufficiently theoretically/axiomatically unstable 
that it communicates effortlessly and clearly with experiential facticity as well 
as spatially and temporally singular and specific givens, deprived of abstrac-
tions and indifferent toward theoretical generalizations and classifications. It 
is impossible to remain indifferent to this web of concepts that Komsic in-
troduces through his theory of social pulsation, and avoid the question: does 
this theory have the critical energy to produce corresponding concepts in the 
process of its reception?
The formation and demise of social and value structures are the inner and 
outer limits of social pulsations, or semantic projections of social relations; 
individual cases, concrete societies, and individual social practices, like the 
example by means of which Komsic seeks to prove his theory, are all realized 
within those limits.
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Then, something happened in Bosnia and Herzegovina that rarely happened in the 
history of any other society— the collapse of the social structure with its independent 
elements entering into conflict with one another, as well as the absence of a value 
system that previously permitted and directed the social activities of the social actors. 
Social practice had the carpet pulled from under its feet, and lost its head as well. In 
that sense, the nature of the Bosnian- Herzegovinian conflictuality, in all its forms, 
has become a historical experience for the world. The examination of those events 
lends itself to a general understanding of human activities, but not from transcen-
dental presumptions of consciousness or its intentionality, nor from ontologically 
given social facts whose “necessity” is also of a metaphysical character, rather from 
social practice which simultaneously constitutes both social actors and social facts. 
We are in such a situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina because our state of conflict 
encompasses all social givens and all values, both subjective and collective. Too, 
we are part of the very social practices we are examining. For the first time in our 
social theory, we have the opportunity to draw theoretical conclusions of general 
significance from our own historical position.To completely understand the historical 
event of Bosnia and Herzegovina, we must begin from the collapse of the social and 
value structure. How could it be that all previous social mechanisms that reproduce 
society and initiate social activities wither away? How could it be that the destruction 
of the social and value system becomes the primary social practice, and what is its 
initiating mechanism? (Komsic, p. 3)
If we were to further follow Searle’s ontology of institution and the properties of 
institutional facts according to the models of their existence (Searle 2005), 
we would have to claim the following: social processes objectively exist when 
social actors act; before or after that, they do not; social facts and states of 
affairs objectively exist when their collective validity is affirmed; before and 
after that, they are bare/brutal physical facts. But this objectivity of existence 
of social facts is absolutely dependent on human will, upon human collective 
intentionality, upon human collective representation or the demand for validity 
claims of status functions, upon the human psycho- physical, mental, moral, 
cultural habitus, upon human relations and attitude, upon human institutions, 
norms, rules, conventions, and laws passed in parliament— for these social 
facts to exist at all.
Social relations are anomalous in their semantic character, in their spatial 
and temporal facticity, in their unstable causality. Despite that, the ontology 
of social relations is objective in its structures and in the mechanisms that 
produce and maintain them. The concepts that Komsic introduces in his the-
ory describe an ontology available to a social phenomenology because social 
relations thus understood, as social pulsations are the real content of a pro-
jective semantics of social relations because of the possibility of redefinition, 
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reconstruction, redescription built into them, which rationalizes them in an 
innovative manner. This innovative rationalization, which Komsic designates 
as a function of innovative reason, can also be regarded as a semantic projection 
of social relations with a capacity of multiple transformations.
Pulsations, or interactive pulsating of one actor towards another, is, ac-
cording to Komsic’s insight, the activity of actors or the active state of actors 
that is determined by their intentions. However, the type of activity in which 
social objects and social relations are produced does not solely depend on the 
intentionality of actors; it is determined by an eightfold causality that is part 
of convergent phenomenologies of social causality,10 without which there is no 
action, not to speak of innovative action. Regardless of whether we interpret 
this relation from Hegel’s phenomenology of the movement of consciousness 
and mutual emergence of the objectivization of self- consciousness and the 
substantiality of being, or through Marx’s self- actualization of production as 
relation in which the subject and the object of praxis and history emerge, or 
from the perspective of Habermas’ theory of communicational action as social 
activity, or, in Mead’s terms, observe it as a product of the movement of social 
reflection of self from “I” to “me” and “me” to “I” through a series of social 
reactions between the individual and the environment- the innovation of an 
individual actor is not external to social relations and semantic transforma-
tions which are possible within the development of context, nor is it external 
to the actions of causality to which every action abides. Komsic concludes his 
explanation and application of his third thesis of the theory of social pulsation 
in the following way:
Each social actor is within a web of social pulsations. Each social actor coordinates 
a multitude of social pulsations in which he finds himself— he is simultaneously the 
bearer and part of social causality. But one social state cannot be transferred to anoth-
er because each has its own causality. Social causality can only be transferred within 
a given social state, from one social actor to another; it cannot be transferred exter-
nally. The web of social interactions enables social actors to simultaneously dwell in 
two social states of varying causality. (Komsic, p. 36)
The implicit ontology of social facticity becomes visible only through ac-
tion, or rather through movement, self- movement, procrastination, semantic 
and structural oscillation, semantic projection, and pulsations in which actors 
relate to one another in real space and time where in formal intentional at-
titudes (hopes, convictions, beliefs, expectations, desires, things considered 
true), without real object reference, are transformed into material intentions 
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through singular or multiplied semantic projection of social relations that 
can be objectified in space and time with real object reference.11 Regardless 
of the type of projection or pulsation that one social relation could possess 
in an actual state A, or potentially/implicitly in projected states A1, A2, A3, 
… An, their causality cannot be substituted with the causality that deter-
mines the state of social relation B and its semantic projections in states 
B1, B2, B3, … Bn. The causality of a given social relation can act on the 
emergence of numerous and diverse states projected in that very relation 
(they are liberated under different conditions, in different states of affairs, in 
different normative demands, in differently established or interpreted deon-
tic connotations), but it cannot determine semantic projections of another 
social relation.
Different social facts require different intentions, reactions, reflections, and different 
communications which result in different institutions. Social actors cannot simulta-
neously internalize different social facts, different values, different rules; such a social 
state would be unbearable, and for individuals, schizophrenic. (Komsic, p. 37)
Thus, conceptual demarcation, deontic demarcation, the demarcation of practice, 
and demarcation of strategy of semantic projections of social relations are nec-
essary for the demarcation of the action of social causality and for the correction 
of its anomalous nature in the actors’ immediate actions:
A healthy society makes sure that social causalities are separated from one another 
and that their limits of activity do not transgress. Likewise, healthy individuals keep 
their social pulsations separate, but they do unify and guide them rationally. (Komsic, 
p. 37)
Komsic tests and applies his theoretical insights to the semantics of the con-
crete, to the social situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, his preferred case 
study.
A social state of undifferentiated causalities was produced in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
with the signing of the Dayton Accord. Social structures, which should have “mean-
ingful content” and be the subjective purpose of its citizens, are in fact in contradic-
tion with one another, overlapping and self- defeating. Social actors are in one society 
while “meaningful content” is in another, in a social state not their own. They are, 
then, in constant conflict with themselves because the social facts in which they act 
cannot be internalized, their intentions provoke reactions which cannot be internal-
ized through communication. The existing social facts, as parts of their social state, 
seem imposed, and not subjectively appointed “meaningful content”. (Komsic, p. 37)
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Social pulsations can be seen as social relations produced by social actors, 
and in order to comprehend them we must understand the possibilities of 
their semantic and pragmatic projections and transformations, all the while 
keeping the anomalous character of social causation in mind. Indeed, a sin-
gle theory of the projective semantics of social relations, which would be 
the basis of a projective social theory, could become the basis of the scientific 
prediction of projective transformations of social states. The greater part of 
states and relations produced in Bosnia and Herzegovina was apparent to 
anyone able to interpret the projections of formal intentions that were erro-
neously oriented towards the destructive forces of a particular group, which, 
like any group, has within itself contradictory deontic, political, moral, and 
economic practices.
The social context, as a communicative, reflexive, active collection of 
unequal potentials and status functions of social actors (the phantom “com-
munity of equality of opportunity” never existed anywhere), is the result 
of the projective compatibility and balance of two vectors: normative social 
relations and formative social values. If the normativity of social relations, 
or rather formativity of social values, is absent or falls apart, so in turn the 
boundaries of the social context (both external and internal) collapse, to-
gether with the institutions that are expressions of normativity and form-
ativity in which the “social” is based, resulting in a chaos out of which a 
new social structure may arise, or actors (individuals, groups, ethnicities, 
nations) completely vanish from the scene as a constituent power capable 
of decisively influencing its own survival. The question is: to what extent 
can the Bosniaks, following the genocide perpetrated on them, constitute 
themselves in an ethnic and national sense, or rather, to what extent can 
they influence their own survival?
Unstable/Empirical Axioms
In Naming and Necessity, Saul Kripke introduces a philosophically ironic syn-
tagm: a priori based on experience!12 Thereby he actually asserts that every 
model of experience and every model of meaning that is possible in the logical 
and semantic sense (on the basis of logical and semantic necessity/logical and 
semantic constructability of relations) is ontologically real and epistemolog-
ically legitimate, therefore valid due to the model of inference, not due to 
the natural necessity of the connection between the sign and the signified, or 
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reference! When applied to the social world or the lifeword, Kripke’s model 
of possible worlds enables us to clearly understand the cognitive or epistemo-
logical or even the political, ethical, economic concept in which contexts or 
models of relations model objects and meanings assigned to them, and not vice 
versa. However, if all possible models (behavior, communication, interpreta-
tion, reaction, reflection, interiorization, etc.) are inherently inferential, so 
much the better for the rigidity of reference! In that case, the pragmatism of 
social relations, as Davidson argues, enables even reality without (objectively 
related) reference, and a partial theory of truth— a truth from a single case! 
(Davidson 2001: 215).
However, in contrast with the philosophical theory of interpretation 
and communication within communicative society, in the sociological no-
tion of lifeworld the concept of necessity in relation to cause- and- effect 
and the concept of a priori or transcendental structures is not acceptable as 
a rigid a priori that could function in all possible worlds or models of social 
relations: social relations are a priori contingent, not a priori transcendental! 
They appear and disappear, changing not only in empirical space and time 
but also in their normative basis which determines the type of necessity ena-
bling them: from necessity as certainty or truth/truthfulness, through neces-
sity as correctness/regularity, to necessity as a pragmatic model of utility, or 
necessity as justification of activity or foregoing of activity: each type of ne-
cessity based on rules or conventions (ethical, logical, economic, political, 
methodological, cognitive, epistemological) functions in the social context, 
all except natural necessity.
Komsic, in a rather hermetic text, based his explanations and commen-
tary on five fundamental propositions that function in his theory of social 
relations. These propositions should axiomatize all that appears in the field 
of interactive communication of social actors and in that way determine the 
kind of non- contradictory logical structure exhibited in social phenomenolo-
gy, which he aims to formulate in his theory of social pulsation. Isolated and 
encompassed in a single set, these axioms characterize an implicit ontology of 
social facticity as a possibility of mapping the factually- truthful and logically- 
truthful within social phenomenology in the very structures of utterances 
about social reality. Thus, when the five propositions, or five theses that con-
stitute Komsic’s theory are placed in a single, axiomatically- arranged vertical, 
then we simultaneously obtain an ontological and epistemological scenario of 
this theory.
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Proposition I. Pulsation is a state of social actors— individuals, social groups, 
institutions, systems. It is an active state.
Proposition II. Pulsating towards each other, social actors produce social 
facts— social relations, institutions, values, rules, laws.
Proposition III. Social actors contain and determine the possibilities of all 
their states.
Proposition IV. The social state is a pulsation of social actors of varying inten-
sity.
Proposition V. A new social state begins when the pulsation of social actors 
wanes or completely loses the purposes that kept its inten-
tions in motion.
This kind of “axiom,” which resides in the logical construction of socially 
conditioned knowledge about social processes, states of affairs, and facts, also 
denotes the nature of that to which social theory refers: the facticity of these 
processes, these states of affairs, these facts, does not possess the static ob-
jectivity of physical things, the physical objects of natural sciences, nor is a 
causality of an absolutely necessary relation of cause- and- effect at work in this 
kind of facticity. Facticity, such as the social one— dependent on language, 
on reflection, on interpretation, on the actors’ intentionality, on time, on 
space, on culture— can only be contingent facticity with anomalous causality in 
its composition, and with anomalous inferentialism in the cognitive reconstruc-
tion of the subject. Facts or states of affairs in social processes are not isolated 
objects or things, they are what is projected (social relations) in social process-
es, what is deontically- prejudged (social values) in social objects. That which is 
projected and prejudjed (or anticipated) in social processes belongs to an implicit 
ontology of social facticity, regardless of whether we refer to structures, to mech-
anisms, to functions of social processes. And, everything points to the fact 
that ontology might be primarily semantic and symbolic.
Komsic’s motives in presenting to the scientific community a new con-
ceptual projection as a possible means of explicating social relations are those 
of a researcher. The aforementioned theses or propositions determine social 
actors as active and innovative, their purposeful and intentional activity in 
the production of social relations as social pulsations, social pulsations as im-
manent social states and not as transcendental sources of knowledge, social 
states as pulsations of social actors of varying intensity. The explanation of 
and commentary on these five theses functions as definitions, theorems, and 
consequences bound together by mapping the contents of these five theses or 
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propositions on micro and macro levels. Social pulsation is actually an active-
ly or functionally, rationally or rationally established relation of social actors 
that is also deontic because it puts forward validity claims for institutional 
(collective) norms through recognizing institutional facts and status (collec-
tive) functions within society.
At the very base of visible social facticity, whose position is marked like 
a chessboard, functions an implicit ontological structure that invisibly, like 
executing a move or establishing relations, determines social relations or sta-
tus functions of actors and the character of their moves. In such mutual and 
recursive activity of altering positions, use of rules, and innovative combina-
tions of possible moves/relations, emerges a production of social phenomena 
and social notions that have very different ontological, logical, and linguistic 
statuses that both congregate and clash around social facticity, while words 
still manage to more or less express thought, and words and notions together 
manage to more or less signify, describe, and present phenomena and facts, 
or rather the social state of affairs. The onus is on the humanities and social 
sciences to explain “how everything is held together” (J.R. Searle) and how it 
is applied to an individual sociological theory about modern society.
The philosophy of social science should ask the following: is the notion 
of “the social” a normative notion or not? In what way, with what semantic 
transfers (semantic transformation of a given conceptual content) do social 
actors comprehend/determine that social connections are really normative 
demarcations that function within every act of social actors as deontic values 
present in every social stereotype or social practice? Should this be determined 
in connection with the vocabulary in which that notion is reflected or in con-
nection with (social) facts and (social) states of affairs to which that notion 
applies: are social processes normative processes, are social facts exclusively a 
product of normative- social processes, are relations of social actors normative 
relations because they are produced by institutional facts, relations in which 
deontic notions are engrained and in which validity claims appear? A norma-
tive vocabulary and normative pragmatics (of which Brandom speaks) of social 
actors in their activities could, with or without the analytical philosophy of 
social science, point to what constitutes social relations in communication, 
while designating what is for them constitutional and enables communication 
as a priori- experiential!
If, in fact, relations of social actors are kinds of pulsation that contain va-
lidity claims, as Komsic avers in his theory of social pulsations, then we could 
claim that this kind of pulsation is normative and that its content is a type 
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of deontic value understood through a web of social actors and their mutual 
actions, their mutual validity claims that function as their normative currency 
which they exchange as value in communication.
Objectively, there are facts that, to exist, require the existence of a subjec-
tive decision, or human institution, without which they would not exist. These 
are, according to Searle, institutional facts (Searle 1997). Let us assume the 
following, in an idiomatic vocabulary: being married to Maria is an institu-
tional/social fact that would not exist if there was no (human) institution of 
marriage; being a father and grandfather is an institutional/social fact because 
there is a (human) institution of the family; being an owner of a piece of land 
in Kiseljak is an institutional/social fact that would be impossible without a 
(human) institution of land ownership; being a mayor of Sarajevo is an insti-
tutional/social fact that exists only if a (human) institution of mayor exists; 
being a professor of sociology at the University of Sarajevo is an institutional/
social fact only because there is a (human) institution of university; being a
Member of Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina between 1992 and 
1995 at the time of the bloodiest aggression on an internationally recognized 
country is an institutional fact only on condition that there is a (human) in-
stitution of president and parliament of a nation.
According to Searle, then, we the people, not gods or nature, produce 
institutions, and institutions, in normatively codifying bare/brutal facts of life, 
produce institutional facts that we experience when we fulfill their norma-
tivity or their validity claims. If we do not acknowledge them, if they do not 
have the collective recognition and acceptance of deontic values which insti-
tutions symbolize in their existence, if they are not formative in the behavior 
of actors and their interaction, then we destroy social institutions. Then, the 
validity claims they emanate bind no one. Then, institutions represent noth-
ing, no deontic claims.
The question that has always motivated sociology, and motivates it still, 
is how institutional facts are possible, what is the structure of those facts, and 
what is the nature of status functions that fulfills that structure? This question 
has always been transformed into: what is an institution (Searle 2005), what 
is the nature of validity claims emanating from it, what types of relations exist 
between actors who are architects of institutions and actors who are bound 
by a web of institutional facts that classify them as employed, unemployed, 
single, married, theists, atheists, educated, uneducated, rich, poor, proprietors, 
owners, laborers, students, professors, magistrates, physical beings, etc.
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Beneath routine, and more- or- less unreflectively/automatically executed 
social functions/practices, which transpire daily and in which millions of so-
cial actors participate, there is a deep, wide web of invisible social ontology 
whose peripheral/exterior layers pulsate above the action of a normative and 
invisible backdrop of causations, whose elucidation demands a complete the-
ory. Behind a banal trip in a Sarajevo tram no. 2, from Marijin Dvor to Latinska 
Cuprija, which begins with some intention to carry out an activity at the other 
end of town, with a physical purchase of a ticket at a ticket office, with the 
entrance onto the tram via the front doors and not the back, the punching 
of the ticket in the machine, looking for an empty seat, asking if a seat is 
available, offering of a seat to an older person, grabbing the handrail, showing 
the ticket to the transit monitor, the egress from the tram at a designated 
station, etc., stands a whole invisible, normative ontology of economic and 
legal relations, ownership, legality, traffic regulations, the budget for public 
transport, the legal status of the public transport system, the rules and norms 
of using public transport, methods of payment in the vehicle, codes and rules 
of civic culture, etiquette and upbringing, ways of behaving, of observing, the 
manner of sitting or standing, of communicating with other passengers, of get-
ting on and getting off, verbal and non- verbal communication, use of signals 
and symbols, traffic infrastructure, symbolic interaction, body language, often 
pugnacious physical acts, and so on to murder (the case of murder in the tram 
of an elementary school student Denis M.) which the degrades and destroys 
the entire normativity of social relations and formativity of social values. An 
ordinary trip on an ordinary tram on an ordinary route becomes a visible col-
lection of elements of unequal potential and status functions, a time and space in 
which norms of behavior are simultaneously regarded and disregarded, and so-
cial values are pertinent and not pertinent. Because of such instability in the 
activities of social normativity, it is possible to understand social causality as 
anomalous causality and social inferentialism as anomalous inferentialism.
The normative or ontological basis of social reality resides in its invisible 
construction or in its structure which, in its normative claims (norms plus sanc-
tions), enables actors to act mechanically and consistently or, at least on the 
surface anomalously, to intentionally or at least unconsciously produce posi-
tive or negative social pulsations as long as rules and norms still apply, as long 
as institutions exist that produce institutional facts, as long as actors that com-
municate as social actors fulfill towards each other validity claims mediated by 
the validation of norms and sanctions. In social relations, nothing is essential 
in the same way as the action of gravity is essential: in fact, everything is ac-
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cidental and anomalously possible in its existence because norms can change 
and laws can cease to apply. Social norms maybe imposed, embraced, broken, 
but they can also fail to apply.
The Anomalous Character of Social Causation
Social relations have their physical, cultural, psychological, semantic, and 
moral history that accompanies them, partakes in their constitution, that is 
multiplied and modified depending on the interpretation and pragmatism to 
which it is subject. In the social context, events can only be determined as 
degrees or levels of process, while their conceptualization must include partial-
ity, granulation, oscillation, particularity. The methodologies that need to be 
applied to research and interpretation of social phenomena have no use for 
binary two value logic, they are rather necessarily directed towards probabilis-
tic and possibilistic methodologies, toward the logic of probability, fuzzy logic, 
epistemological logic, temporal logic, situational logic, deontic logic, modal 
logic, and logics that includes para- consistent constructions.
For an interpretation of social relations it is necessary to introduce the con-
cept of actions of social actors, and to have a concept of social causation. Howev-
er, the character of such causation is not the same as the character of causation 
in natural processes. In nature, too, many processes and developments occur 
in a dynamic and elemental manner, but the basic laws of physical, chemical, 
and biological processes remain fixed in the production of unambiguous conse-
quences and they do not depend on the polysemy of the “language” of nature, 
on the “discourse” of nature, on the “free will” of nature, on the “choice” of 
nature, on some “spiritual” or “social” elements of nature. Everything depends 
on the world that man creates and is responsible for, and everything can have 
consequences: erroneous or evil acts towards others can be justified by good 
intentions, good intentions can have evil consequences, the collective will can 
destroy individuals, public discourse can be hate speech, the semantics of nat-
ural language can produce semantic paradoxes, decision- making and problem- 
solving can produce beneficial or damaging consequences, dropping the atom 
bomb on two Japanese cities can be justified as the desire for peace!
Komsic’s idea to call social actors social pulsators, who, through their social 
pulsations, realize the web of social pulsations that makes up the content of 
social practice, carries certain connotations that we find neither in Haber-
mas’s, Weber’s, nor in Mead’s theory of social relations.
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Indeed, it is important to recognize that causality is not of a fixed intensity. Moving 
from one place to another, from one subject to another, it loses its intensity, its 
strength in action. Social actors, as bearers of social practice, must be observed in 
the context of this transfer of causality and its varying intensity. Social actors are the 
social pulsators, and as such, are the subjects of social practice. Their relation is the 
web of social pulsation of varying intensity. (Komsic, p. 79)
Namely, the decisive observation here is that we are dealing with transferable 
causality, which acts upon those who themselves act in social relations, that 
this action is not merely external and transitive, but rather transferable and 
interactive in the substantive sense: without such action, without this kind of 
causality and without these kinds of social actors/social pulsators, neither soci-
ety nor knowledge about social relations would be possible. The idea of social 
pulsation puts everything into motion and offers the possibility of thinking 
about invisible dimensions of social space whose existence can only be proven 
by reflection based on modeling possible social worlds such as an innovative 
mind is able to produce.
The anomalous inferentialism of social actors can correspond to the anom-
alous nature of causality of social facts. What is anomalous in this causality 
and this inferentialism in which we assume that logic is the semantics of social 
relations? Social facts, social states of affairs, social processes, do not produce 
identical intentions, identical reflections, identical reactions, identical interi-
ority, identical communication, in all social actors. Identical social facts that 
have the same causal power do not produce identical consequences. Where 
social causality acts on social pulsators/actors, its anomalous nature acts also; 
where there is transferable causality there is also differentiated intensity, ap-
pearance and disappearance, fatigue and loss, or renewal and accumulation 
among other social actors. These are the conclusions which follow. What we 
here call the anomalous character of social causation applies equally to the rela-
tion social- social and social- physical as to the relation psychological- physical and 
psychological- social, which Donald Davidson discusses (Davidson 2001: 214).
Do social pulsations, as social states, as described by Komsic, have the 
anomalous character which we attribute to social causality in general? What 
would comprise that anomaly/anomalousness if an actor, either as a subjective 
subject (individual) or objective subject (the collective), was involved in some 
process, some event, some state of affairs? According to Searle’s understanding 
of social ontology, what is epistemologically subjective, such as social insti-
tutions, must be recognized as ontologically objective, real, and existing, and 
all social facts, states of affairs, phenomena, and processes have such a status. 
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But, taking into account Komsic’s theory of social pulsation, that which is 
epistemologically subjective and ontologically objective must pass the test of 
the semantic projection of the concept of “the social,” evidence constructed in 
eight ways (a- h). What Searle did not mention, but which we could include 
here on account of Komsic’s theory, is that social concepts (epistemologically 
objective) have their own social reality and value (ontologically subjective) only 
when they are able, through their very existence, to offer individual or col-
lective evidence (ontologically objective) in a semantic projection of multiplied 
correspondences, which are in fact identity reactions of social actors.
Sociology, as we already said, has understood its topic from unevenly placed causal-
ity since its very beginning until the present— whether it was placed in the social 
structure, or in the interaction between social actors; in both cases it was a question 
of “principal cause.” Sociological theories rarely, if ever, overcome this dichotomy. 
Because of that, we must introduce a new concept which will prevail over this di-
chotomy. We propose the concept of transferable causality. In fact, it is rather difficult 
to locate the so– called principal cause of the social action and the social system. 
Whether we place it within the social structure, whether we place it with the social 
actors, social practice is never completely enclosed. It seems there is not an unambig-
uous determination by which it could be determined and explainable by either one 
cause or another. If we were to analyze only the political behaviors we would realize 
that they are caused, on the one hand, by socially– valued givens and collective in-
terests, while on the other hand, those same values and social givens are caused and 
situated by a particular political practice. That is how, the perspective of the country 
and society of Bosnia and Herzegovina could be examined from the existing insti-
tutional divisions and their non– functionality, but we must simultaneously realize 
that these divisions and non– functionalities are caused by the practice of political 
actors— both as individuals and political organizations. The “principal cause” of the 
social and political situation is always being transferred from one social position to 
another, from one social actor to another; however, social actors are not only in-
dividuals (as we have come to know them in all interactional theories), but social 
gatherings and institutions as well (yet not in a structural sense). Not one social actor 
permanently maintains the meaning of the principal social cause. The cause is trans-
ferred from one to the other, changing social position and direction of action. That 
phenomenon could be understood and explained through the notion of transferable 
causality. (Komsic, p. 5)
The production of social relations is the way man produces himself, or, as 
Marx says, the way man produces his kind. Values are at the centre of this pro-
duction, and deontic axioms do not always produce the same state of affairs, the 
same facts for the self and for others. Ethical inferentialism, contingent upon 
“the strategy of conceptual demarcation” (Brandom) in both depth (synon-
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ymous predication, homologisation) and breadth (homonymous predication, 
granulation), does not here correspond to natural causality which dominates 
the facticity of physical acts in time and space. Values attributed to self and 
other— in the acts of the self and in the acts of the other— are always given 
in every act of consciousness and every act of conscious evaluation, and they 
make previous experience (experiential knowledge that precedes action in ex-
perience) the background, both as a moral and semantic history of social actors.
When we talk about the goal- instrumental operation, it does not elicit dilemmas. 
However, when we talk about value- rational operations, or about man’s actions to-
ward himself and others, causality starts losing its firm and fixed ground. Values and 
social institutions are not the results and effects of social interaction, they are rather 
a conscious element of the social actors, therefore the causality of their social actions 
cannot be one- sidedly determined. Value- social givens have both an objective and 
subjective validity, and a reciprocal relation too, making them sometimes the frame-
work and sometimes the goals and means of social actors. (Komsic, p. 6)
There are two key characteristics of social causality or causality that exists in 
the acts of social actors in real time and space, which Komsic directly asso-
ciates with goal- instrumental and value- social causality. First, in both cases 
there is a frequent transfer of causality from one sector to another, from value 
neutral (“the objective”) into distinctly valued (“the subjective”). Second, 
the transfer of causality moves towards things and ends with commodifica-
tion. Third, and perhaps most important, the weakness of causality, or rather 
the weakness of causal idioms of identification and representation, is reflected 
not only in the physical but also cognitive, moral, and psychological state of 
actors, their mentality, which is reflected in change of choice, in change of 
technology for solving problems and making decisions. This is all evidence for 
the anomalous character of social causality and its instability. Komsic argues:
Both the goal- instrumental and value- rational action retains meaning for as long as 
they are rational, that is, for as long as they achieve their ends. Those ends are achieved 
through a repetition of actions and procedures because their results are affirmed as use-
ful, valiant, and good. Utility and value of those actions and procedures are confirmed 
through their results— tools, actions, techniques, as well as values, norms, rules, laws, 
etc. Their need for repetition, affirmation, and perfection stems from this. An exchange 
of action levels occurs when “rationality” disappears, when causality wanes. The trans-
fer of causality from one type of action to the other is evidence that the ends have lost 
their potentiality and strength. This can be overcome with the introduction of new 
ends. How do we achieve that in a case of social pulsation with little or no intensity? It 
is possible only with a new creative power of mind. (Komsic, p. 10)
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Social phenomenology, which Komsic borrows to establish a relationship be-
tween social actors and social mechanisms, is actually granulated through con-
vergent phenomenologies which include or exclude an eightfold causality. Komsic 
has referred to this eightfold causality as an eightfold phenomenal given through 
which social mechanisms act.
Social pulsation is an complex state of action that cumulatively encompasses all its 
phenomena: intention, reaction, reflection, communication, institutionalization, in-
ternalization, structuration, and innovation. (Komsic, p. 11)
The way in which Komsic explains the nature and actions of the aforemen-
tioned phenomena- causes establishing and changing social states testifies to 
the functional states of consciousness which, in Marxist thought, determines 
what is and in what way it is a social being. Social phenomenology, which 
takes nothing social as a transcendental condition of social phenomena, is 
forced to granulate itself into a bigger or smaller number of convergent phe-
nomenologies that can indicate how different sequences of social consciousness 
determines different sequences of (social) being. The phenomenology of the 
lifeworld, in which endless causal elements are at work, cannot subsume them 
under a single transcendental scheme of identification and representation, it 
must rather explicate the meaning of those elements in their convergent practices 
and agency. Thus, “a single phenomenological sociology” (Schultz) is possible 
only as a practical system of convergent phenomenologies.
The Dialectic Character of Social Inferentialism
The inferential model of social syllogism can only be anomalous, or rather dia-
lectic, with likely or merely possible premises because they are based on people’s 
convictions, on the consideration of truth, on the thoughts of authorities or 
groups (Aristotle’s dialektikos syllogismos), that is on the collective recogni-
tion/acceptance of their deontic content. However, this very “recognition” 
and “acceptance” is multiply relative, contingent upon the socio- cultural, 
political, economic, psychological, and other formative conditions of each 
individual. Thus, the conceptual demarcation of such inferentialism does not 
possess a necessary categorical identification of the entire notional content, 
it does not homogenize all antecedents and all consequents apophantical-
ly (Aristotle’s apofantikos syllogismos), it is not completely logically founded 
(L- truth in Rudolph Carnap’s terms) because it is not derived by logical rules 
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and laws from necessarily truthful premises which logical and cognitive syn-
onymy sustains, but rather is only semantically and homonymously determined 
characterization of facticity (F- truth in Carnap’s terms) in representations 
and multiplied transformations of meaning of deontic value judgments that de-
pend on the social, psychological, mental, historical, and moral background of 
each individual, as well as different collectives. This type of proposition about 
facticity cannot be axiomized, and the upper premises of dialectic syllogism 
are those which we here call “quasi- axioms” or “unstable axioms.”
Which concept of rationality then is it possible to represent, which type 
of human rational action is it possible to predict under relative conditions 
and from beings that are fallible in their every domain? The perspective of 
“God’s eye view” (Putnam phrase) is least likely in the social sciences where 
everything depends on people, on their actions or in- actions, on their morality 
and sensual constitution, on their perceptions, on their fallible nature. Social 
syllogism, with probable premises, is almost always deontic syllogism; deontic 
logic is present within it via deontic operators: “it follows that…”, “it is allowed 
to…”, “it is required to…”, “it is necessary to…”, “it should mean that…”, and 
via quasi- epistemic operators: “we accept that…”, “we concur that…”, “it has 
always been that…”, “it is normal to…”, “the majority thinks that…”, “intelligent 
people believe that…”, “it is unthinkable to…”. Then, how is it possible to append 
to deontic logic and anomalous social syllogism, whose premises are never 
necessary but rather approximately truthful, and whose judgment pertains to 
possible states of affairs and future events as well as possible processes, a dia-
lectics of innovative reason that would go beyond the experience covered by 
the vocabulary of these operators and beyond deontic value- judgments that 
are moored by unstable dialectical “axioms” of conviction?
What is, finally, the social theory outlined here in the theory of social 
pulsation, perceived from the standpoint of social inferentialism and the 
types of rationalism that operate within in? It should be noted that Komic’s 
approach is a social theory based on criteria, values, and activities of active 
(socio- active) reason or social reason that culminates in the phenomena of 
creativity of communication, in the innovation of action, in the technologies 
of projective semantics whose implicit pulsations are explained by the logic 
that explicates them in real space and time. This also means that, in this 
book, a new role is given to innovative- creative rationality as an organon 
of social illumination in which social relations are conceptualized and in 
whose cognitive vocabulary the open webs of interactive symbolic action 
are explicated. Here, logic is actually a semantic theory of interpretation of 
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praxis implicitly contained in linguistic practices, in communicative prac-
tices, in the multiplied practices of social actors in which validity claims 
of the deontic content of social relations are either proposed, accepted or 
rejected, or realized.
Validity claims/social norms/social conventions are a special class of the 
social/collective status of actors which are recognized through symbolic inter-
actionism13 as socially justified, but which are, primarily, as deontic content, 
built into the foundations of institutions and subsequently activated, referred 
to, discovered in action, again recognized in stances and actions, taken as a 
measure and measured, realized in individual social practices. In social prac-
tices, regardless of their source or application, it is automatically a matter 
of social vocabulary and social inferentialism where social norms, presented to 
deontic operators, become the main premise (universal premise) of social syl-
logism which is, in nature and source, in fact dialectic (producing possibly 
truthful claims, not necessarily truthful claims) and discursive. Social practic-
es contain culturally relative and socially relative idioms that are not universally 
conceptualized, institutionalized, normativized, rather they are conventional, 
traditional, sometimes neither valid nor socially justified models of behaviour 
or communication either generally or globally, they are relative to ethnic and 
cultural ensembles/structuration, but which enable the activity of social ac-
tors in sub- social interactions, which are idiomatic or anomalous life forms, to 
inhabit/pulsate what is implicit in them.
However, social inferentialism enters idiomatic structures as the logic of 
interpretation and explicates them in the vocabulary of phenomena that are 
standardized and institutionalized. What pulsates in the anomalous idiomatic 
life form, whose structure and semantics is the result of anomalous social mon-
ism, must be explicated by social inferentialism in some collection of stereotypic 
social behavior— social reactions in social cases— in order to arrive at a social 
theory. Social phenomenology, as presented in Komsic’s theory of social pul-
sation, has pretensions to conceptualize the implicit anomalous and idiomatic 
social being that is produced by social actors through several key concepts: 
intention, reaction, reflection, etc.
The strategies of social inferentialism, which function via communica-
tional nodes/social syllogisms (inferential stereotypes), point not only to con-
ceptual demarcation but also to the activities of semantic stereotypes which 
retain that demarcation within themselves: it is not possible to act inten-
tionally or reflexively in society without the internal activity of semantic and 
moral, spatial and temporal, stereotypes that actors transfer among each other 
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in a communicational community. The inferential stereotypes and semantic 
stereotypes that members of social communication transfer to each other are 
the very centre of transferable causality that acts on social actors.
The theory of communicative action, as developed by Habermas, includes 
aspects of social inferentialism as a specific pragmatism in communication 
that is based on the use of language (a community of language) and (Mead’s) 
concept of action/activity (community of action/activity). The communicative 
community itself is no absolute whole composed of its parts, but of action, and 
therefore even the lifeworld in which it operates is relative to the variables by 
which it expresses this action. Habermas writes:
The communicative concept of the lifeworld breaks with the idea of a whole com-
posed of parts. The lifeworld is constituted from a network of communicative actions 
that branch out through social space and historical time, and these live off sources of 
cultural traditions and legitimate orders no less than they depend on the identities of 
socialized individuals. Thus the lifeworld is not a large organization to which mem-
bers belong, it is not an association or a union in which individuals band together, 
nor is it a collectivity made up of members. Socialized individuals could not main-
tain themselves as subjects at all if they did not find support in the relationships of 
reciprocal recognition articulated in cultural traditions and stabilized in legitimate 
orders- and vice versa. The everyday communicative practice in which the lifeworld 
is centered issues equiprimordially from the interplay of cultural reproduction, social 
integration, and socialization. Culture, society, and personality mutually presuppose 
one another. The normative concept of a legal community as an association of free 
and equal consociates under law, a notion that philosophical discussions still retain, 
is too concrete for social theory. (Habermas 1996: 80)
However, inferential social phenomenology, which implies communication of 
actors as well as the social, cultural, and personal relativity of interactions, 
must answer complex questions of social theory: in what way, under what con-
ditions, in relation to what variables do the stances/attitudes of social actors 
arise, do those stances/attitudes have a binding character for all participants 
in social relations or only for the group that prefers certain social, political, 
ethical, aesthetic principles that it takes into account when making a deci-
sion; are judgments of social facticity (which we could also call the inferential-
ism of pulsation of social actors- social pulsators, to borrow Komsic’s terms) the 
functions of variables that constitute a web of interactive concepts/variables 
without which the notion of “social” or “the social” cannot be understood: 
(a) intention, (b) reaction, (c) reflection, (d) communication, (e) institution-
alization, (f) interiorization, (g) structuration, (h) innovation?
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Connectionism of Social Facticity
Social theory should not be a descriptive interpretation, nor can descriptive 
sociology delve deeper into the granulations of variables that determine social 
facticity. Indeed, a new social theory should contain an inferential theory 
of society that indicates or makes explicit the logic of relations that emerge 
between social actors— the logic of relations that can exist between social 
phenomena— and especially the logic of relations that can be a part of the in-
ferential web of notions that cover or conceptualize both the actions of actors 
and the existence of social phenomena, as well as the emergence and disap-
pearance of social relations. In the communicational theory of action, of both 
Habermas and Brandom, “logic is the organ of semantic self- consciousness” 
(Brandom 1994: xix).
What does it mean to construct a projective semantics of social phenomena, 
and how should it be introduced into the theory of social inferentialism within 
which fundamental notions and fundamental actions, which bear (or, better 
said, place before them) the request for normativity that should be realized 
amid the anomalous and relative context formed by the phenomena of po-
litical ontology, would be made explicit? A projective sociology, which would 
be the logic of prediction of parallelly distributed connections of semantic and 
symbolic effects of anomalous causality of social phenomena, could be part of 
a social phenomenology which would not seek dichotomies but specify distinc-
tions (fuzzyfication) in social pulsations. All social relations that currently act 
in a social context act simultaneously and in parallel toward each other, in-
fluence each other, increase/include each other, or annul and eliminate each 
other. The concept of globalization expresses only that this transfer of social 
action takes place on a global scale. Political economy, which wishes to pene-
trate the processes which are no longer a transparent as in Marx’s time of class 
stratification, must construct a connectionist approach.
It was stated earlier that a single adequate connectionist theory of society, 
which would have a projective semantics of social relations as its own primary 
instrument, could offer an adequate explication of the interactions of social 
actors if we ensure that social structures are perceived as social webs of the 
lifeworld in which anomalous causality is corrected by projective transfor-
mations within symbolic and pragmatic practices and strategies of action. If 
social practices are established, as we here claim, on anomalous causality and 
anomalous social inferencialism, then the connectionism or parallel distributed 
semantic projections of social relations means that all actors and all their rela-
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tions are simultaneously brought into relation within a single context. This 
means that the multiplied social relations are explained from the multiplied 
connections of social actors, their models of identification and representation 
in the social context. Only a system of convergent phenomenologies can at-
tain such a connectionist form of social phenomena in the lifeworld.
However, would even that definition of lifeworld be complete and ab-
solutely consequent? A single assemblage/context of social relations, which 
a single sequence of social relations (r) could constitute, cannot constitute 
a system (S) of actions and reactions, intentions and interiorizations, reflec-
tions and innovations (a system of action) in which we could prove/predict 
that all relations are attainable (Sr (r)): there is at least one unrealizable/un-
predictable social relation that cannot be deduced/predicted from unstable 
dialectic axioms present in every social syllogism. All consequences and re-
lations which social facticity produces through actors’ actions can never be 
fully known, and such a system is never complete and finite, which means 
it cannot be completely consistent/predictable. All social relations within a 
single model of communication, which presupposes them, do not ever have to 
be realized. The non- provability of the consequentiality of implicit deduction of 
propositions within formal systems14 is not reserved only for logical and math-
ematical entities (symbols), but sooner and the more so for the functioning 
of the context/structure of social relations that are in themselves dialectical/
possible and inconsistent/anomalous. Connectionism is here determined by 
para- consistency, similar to how Tarski’s ω— consistency is moored in a se-
mantic paradox: “everything is possible, except this and that.”15
If a theory creates ideal stereotypes (Putnam), or ideal types (Weber), or 
ideal structures (Giddens), then it establishes principles, axioms, and rules for 
derivative interpretations: from top to bottom, from the normative to the real, 
which maybe anomalous and idiomatically relative, (un)determined by cau-
sality in space and time, by character and will, by associational and psycho-
logical limits whose interpretation would only mean some beginning in some 
theory! It would mean that the theory of social reality would be a collection of 
sub- theories that would multiply until the very last one would have the lowest 
degree of generalizations and axiomatizations, and the largest degree of the 
semantics of the concrete. But the question is: could it “lean” a little lower in 
order to skip over an ideal theoretical state into an anomalous practice and 
there take on the appearance of truth? The anomalous theory of truth— the 
theory from a single case— which some philosophers (Davidson) and sociol-
ogists have advocated— is based on a partial theory of truth, on a pragmatic 
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model that can function normatively in a possible world of relations! This 
is of course not supported by metaphysical philosophy because its operating 
software of generalization lacks these possibilities.
As far as social innovativeness, which is a type of freedom, is concerned 
Komsic’s Theory of Social Pulsation offers more of a new approach than definite 
and monolithic solutions to the interactions of social actors; rather, it sees 
the innovation of social action as both ends and means. This approach has 
changed the understanding of social processes and social relations which are 
no longer seen as static, rigid points, or objects determinable by ideal types 
or by firm structures of social mechanisms, or by pragmatic models of social 
behaviorism. The phenomenology of social relations needs a projective logic as 
a semantic self- understanding of social determinism, social Darwinism, and 
social pragmatism which depends on anomalous inferentialism and the con-
tingency of these very social processes.
Komsic’s theory of social pulsation has its own anchor in his theory of social 
reason: in Porphyrii’s terms, “reason is everywhere and nowhere,”16 both ac-
tive and passive, collective gathering and dispersive, lawful and lawless, repul-
sive and attractive, it is the motor of social activities and it has the power to 
comprehend them in a contradictory social semantics which it produces through 
its own action as well as the actions of individuals and groups. The fate of 
humanity depends on the use of its reason— whose social action is never value 
neutral— while the values themselves are ethical and semantic variables that 
contain within themselves degrees of fuzzyfication, from the absolutely nega-
tive, moderately negative, negative, positive, moderately positive, absolutely 
positive.
This transfer of energy into the social field must be explained, from the in-
dividual to the group, from the group to the individual. This transfer of social 
pulsations is not an open exchange of energy in a given social space; it is de-
termined and channeled through the construction of institutions which then 
begin to emanate types of validity claims (stereotypes) which the actors fulfill 
or fail to fulfill towards each other. If social pulsations, which Komsic discusses, 
are seen as parallel distributed relations between social actors, then we need a 
wholly new logic— different from two valued and dichotomous logics— to un-
derstand society. We need a modal logic that incorporates within itself both 
the possibilities of para- consistency and fuzzy logic in particular, which Lofty 
A. Zadeh, its creator, primarily attributes to the social sciences.17 The inaccu-
racy of social relations, the anomalous character of social processes, the gra-
dation of social actions, the description and redescription and interpretation 
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of the communication of social actors, demands the appropriation of words, 
notions, and objects as variables whose meaning should be granulated (Za-
deh’s strategy of Computing with Words). Such granulation, or fuzzyfication, is 
possible not only through fuzzy functions but also through a projective seman-
tics of social relations as the basis of a connectionist social theory that can emerge 
under the aegis of a system of convergent phenomenologies.
The Rationalization of the Anomalous Nature of 
Social Facticity
Analyzing the phenomena of the social world and lifeworld, which is not 
based on any transcendental I (in the sense of Husserl’s phenomenological 
methods and epistemological approaches), is nevertheless, in the final analy-
sis, motivated by Komsic’s need to clarify and illustrate the dominant concept 
of rationality that acts in the activities of social actors. The implicit part of 
his approach to social theory is directed precisely at the concept of ration-
ality, or the concept of reason, or the concept of rational action under the 
circumstances of “the function of social facticity” which rejects the logically- 
categorial measures of the subject and the concepts of natural causality. The 
work of the concept, in Hegel’s sense of the mobile interaction of being and 
consciousness, and the function of facticity in the social world of anomalous 
relations which unfolds without the teleological monitoring of a world spirit, 
cannot be mapped in any social phenomenology: the “work of facticity” can 
guide the “development of society” towards an absolute non- unity of the gen-
eral and the concrete, or rather in a completely opposite direction, towards 
the realization of unhappy consciousness and collective tragedy. Here, the 
concrete and the general continuously oscillate and frequently find them-
selves in different energetic/social states without the possibility of establishing 
dialectical unity.
According to Davidson, redescription (Davidson 2001: 105) is a type of 
rationalization where the intention of action of a given subject is revealed or 
explained through the constant supply of truth conditions. In fact, it reveals 
the primary reason of action: the reason why somebody (in a given context) 
raised his hand on the street is his intention to hail a cab, (in another con-
text) to vote for or against something at some meeting, (in the third context) 
to participate at some auction, (in the fourth context) to get somebody’s at-
tention, (in the fifth context) to stretch his arm, (in the sixth context)18 etc. 
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Let us now turn this inductive redescription towards seeking the primary reasons 
of the social pulsations which emerge between social actors. Komsic, in his 
social phenomenology, places precisely intentionality in first place in his matrix 
of eightfold causality.
For Davidson, “intention is not a part of action, it is its outcome” (Ibid. 
105). For Komsic, it is the matrix of eightfold reality in which each element 
of the mechanism of Action can play the role of primary reason. A reaction 
may be the cause of action as much as reflection. Thus, it is a matter of the 
matrix of convergent causation in which each of the eight causes of social 
pulsation could be the primary reason for a given social pulsation or for a 
given transformation of an existing social relation in its projective appearance. 
Thus, it should be added here that it is necessary, apart from the formal and 
material implications, whose differentiation is crucial for a pure logical form 
of inferentialism, to introduce a distinction between formal and material in-
tentionality for the semantic content of inferentialism within which Kom-
sic’s eightfold causality of social processes can be better situated. For social 
processes or social events themselves, and not just the actors that trigger 
and produce them, stir new social processes or social events, so in this case 
the primary reason of action will not be intentionality, but sooner reaction 
or even reflection. It is a matter of transferable causality, of which Komsic 
justly speaks!
In his first proposition of The Theory of Social Pulsation, Komsic determines 
what pulsations are: they are states in which social actors operate (individu-
als, social groups, institutions). These states are active and effective, which 
means that pulsations produce pulsations, social states produce social states, 
or rather there is an extensive web of social states, social pulsations, and social 
facts, which emerge in the interaction of social actors, social pulsators, and 
in communication. Second: social pulsation is an ordered active state which 
communicatively embraces all of its phenomena: (a) intention, (b) reaction, 
(c) reflection, (d) communication, (e) institutionalization, (f) internalization, 
(g) structuration, (h) innovation. For Komsic, the relationship between pul-
sations is synergetic, their mutual actions can be expressed through function 
and their impact on social phenomena can be analyzed.
Despite the varying affects of the phenomena of pulsation on a given social system, 
a strong relation can occur between them. The dynamics of pulsation is equal to the 
function as well as the functional connection of all its phenomena; it can be repre-
sented in the following equation: P = ph (a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h). All phenomena from “a” 
intention to “h” innovation are changeable but calculable. (Komsic, p. 61)
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The division of pulsations into functional and dysfunctional— that is those 
that have a positive and negative effect on social processes and change states 
of affairs— is likewise important.
The ideal state is when the dynamics of a social state is a function of all the phenome-
na of pulsation— that is, when they are all simultaneously represented. However, this 
is rarely the case. This departure from the ideal state imparts a particular character 
to the social state and relation that is determined within it. The differentiability of 
a given social state depends on the number of represented phenomena of pulsation. 
The functions within a single social state are determined by that number, and they 
can be calculated. Pulsation, then, can be functional and dysfunctional. The func-
tional pulsation is a function of adequate number of its phenomena. It does not need 
to incorporate the entirety of its phenomena, like in the ideal state, but it should 
incorporate those that enable the social activity of actors as well as the maintenance 
of social institutions. (Komsic, p. 61)
Komsic has described the intentional relationship of social actors— who have 
mutual reactions towards that relation, who reflect that relation in commu-
nication and institutionalize it through internalization, thus producing some 
objective social structure— as a dialectic evolution of phenomena of social con-
sciousness and self- consciousness that ends with an absolute negation of all pre-
vious degrees: in innovation that is a product of a creative mind whose actions 
become the source of new social energy. Here, Aristotelian and Hegelian 
understandings/conceptions briefly intersect in a naturalist phenomenology of 
social spirit. Individual pulsations, like individual social facts, have their source 
(or the source of their social energy) in the lifeworld, and they have their 
date of expiration in the ensuing changes; for the existence of society how-
ever, there needs to be an enduring, general, and necessary anomalous social 
interaction with its own social causality. With this, Komsic has introduced 
differentiation in form of rationalization to his theory: rational action based 
on attaining objectives (teleological, Aristotelian), rational action based on 
acknowledging values as parts of collective and individual consciousness (ax-
iological, Weberian), rational action based on laws and abilities of linguistic 
communication (hermeneutical, communicational, Habermasian), and ra-
tional action that is innovative, creative, inventive (not determined by pur-
pose, value, understanding).
Thus, an adequate nature of the social mind or social rationality should 
correspond to the temporal nature of social facts as a product of social pulsa-
tions of social actors. Social facts are a product of social pulsations, a natural 
state of social actors in real space and time. The communicative web of social 
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pulsations is not possible without anomalous inferentialism or without the se-
mantics of social relations which are determined— rather, attributed to— facts 
and processes by the innovative social mind. The attribution of meaning to 
facts in an intentional way and the collective sustainability of validity of given 
meanings (the semantic transfer of causality) turns those facts into social facts; 
the function of collective reason and collective intentionality is to attribute 
or bestow meaning to facts and to accept them through the reception of sta-
tus functions of given symbolic representations. Validity claims are claims for 
status functions to become norms of behavior for social actors— to become an 
institutional fact. This attribution of meaning and validity claims functions 
as a categorical identification of social values of a specific type of facticity (“Y is 
good,” or “Y is just,” or “Y is moral,” or “Y is obligatory”) and their symbolic 
attributive representation (“X represents Y,” or “X acts as Y,” or “X is taken as 
Y,” or “X is considered Y,” or “this piece of paper is a $20 bill” or “this piece of 
plastic represents money”).
Noting the difference in type of rationality and the difference in the on-
tological existence of facts, processes, states of affairs, Komsic introduces inno-
vative reason to social communication and interpretation. Now the question 
becomes: if social relations are transparent, if the status of social actors is 
transparent, if “social play”—where workers could be taken for capitalists, 
where the poor can represent the rich, where attributive representation is 
impossible without being based in categorial identification— is not possible, 
then how is it possible for innovative reason to have a trajectory or direction 
in solving problems and reaching decisions that are neither ordinarily valued 
nor conventionally normative procedures?
How is the action of innovative reason possible from the standpoint of 
singular or multiplied transformations of meaning (Schutz) that social rela-
tions may possess? The projective semantics of social relations should answer 
the question: how is it possible for innovative reason to execute the rational-
ization or rational redescription of social processes and states of affairs under 
the conditions of incessant activity of eightfold causality? In any function of 
eight variables each reduction or absence of a single cause should be compen-
sated by innovative singular transformations which would bestow the same 
meaning, but a different notion, onto the pertinent phenomena. How can 
innovative reason rival anomalous causality when it slips from the matrix of 
eightfold causality, or if one or more of the causers or transferors of (transfer-
able) causation is inactive?
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Here, we can call on the distinction between formal and material inten-
tionality that corresponds to that between belief/conviction and action/func-
tion: intentionality that is directed towards impossible, unattainable, utopian 
goals or non- existing objects should be distinguished from intentionality that 
is geared toward real, attainable goals or existing objects and states of affairs. 
Komsic deals with this by considering the internalization of change in the 
ontological and epistemological status of social facticity.
However, we must ask, how is something internalized if it does not exist as a social 
fact or value? Such internalization emerges from the mind, the creative mind. The 
mind generates a new paradigm of action which the social actor must internalize 
and project as new, “meaningful content” and present it as a validity claim— it must 
become the content of communication.
The creative mind reflects upon the existing social facts and monitors the 
depletion of their “meaningful content”, their communicational limits, then, 
after determining their new “meaningful content”, transcends their boundaries. 
Innovation is the demand of the creative mind but it is the phenomena of social 
pulsation because it emerges in the inner boundaries of communication and struc-
turation. It is not determined by existing structures because the creative mind 
liberates it from them, but it is still in part theirs because it manifests itself within 
their boundaries and insufficiencies, in depletion and in anomalies of their causal-
ity. (Komsic, p. 58)
Komsic has connected innovative reason with creative understanding where-
in it would be possible to lose the anomalous character of social causality and 
the anomalous character of social inferentialism.
Aside from this theoretical and practical knowledge, another form of knowledge is es-
sential— a form that will not meddle between them and that will go beyond the con-
tradictions of blindness of immediacy and realized necessity. It is creative knowledge, 
not merely experienced and analytically- synthetic, but the possibility of the new. It 
must not be arbitrary or an escape from reality, but rather the power of reason that 
relies on experienced and analytically- synthetic knowledge; it is in some sense theo-
retical but it does not have the certainty of the general or the necessary, and it knows 
it. It applies the possible, not the necessary, because it is aware that action cannot 
be theoretically determined till the end. Creative knowledge is neither dogmatic nor 
utopian, it is simultaneously knowledge and action of the new— it is its reality as well 
as its request for realization. (Komsic, p. 53)
When it comes to the role of a new approach, a new conceptualization, or the 
production of new theoretical paradigms in social theory, Komsic avers that a 
new theory or a new approach is the optimal starting point for a new theory.
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The theory of pulsation, as a new theory, does not only understand and explain them 
(“concrete ranges”), it presents them differently from how they were previously in-
terpreted; this theory does not leave rocks unturned. Our contemporary experiences 
can no longer be explained in a conventional manner: a constellation of historical 
facts, real and structured relationships, or just intentions of social actors who trade 
those structures for new ones. They are explainable only through a new theoretical 
perspective in which historical facts, individual roles, and the emergence of new 
social institutions and laws, acquire new forms (of being). It only appears to be the 
old, familiar world, but it is in fact a new world and its newness only evident from the 
perspective of the new theory. (Komsic, p. 55)
A new theoretical perspective or a new viewpoint, a new approach to old 
understandings and explanations of social phenomena, is not possible without 
a projective semantics of social relations that, with its act of innovation, has 
the opportunity to unveil/produce transformations of social relations or new 
forms of transfer of causality within the scheme of eightfold causality, which 
Komsic discusses. The number of dimensions of causality that a theory of so-
cial pulsation, or a theory of projective semantics of social relations, discovers 
or unveils, depends on the innovativeness of the actors and the possibility 
of interpretation, rationalization, and redescription of anomalous forms of social 
inferentialism.19
Concluding Remarks
Komsic’s Theory of Social Pulsations needs to be critically analyzed by soci-
ologists and social theorists who are prone to coupling the processes of so-
cial ontology with the processes of political ontology, to applying methods 
of research as well as the knowledge content of the theory of communicative 
action, the analytical philosophy of the social sciences, cognitive knowledge, 
the philosophy of natural sciences, and to enter, thus equipped, the semantics 
of the concrete, the reality in which they directly live and act.
The idea of projective sociology, or the theory of the projective semantics of 
social relations, whose conceptualization we constructed as a possible model 
of redescription and rationalization of Komsic’s theory of social pulsation, 
emerged spontaneously as a possible (in Kripke’s sense) Gedankenexperiment 
that refers to the theory of social pulsation. We believe it will attain its own 
expression very quickly in research that is already (partly) under way.
The attempt to explain a new theory in sociology and a new approach to 
social theory by means of its own terminology could not be anything other 
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than reflexive and innovative. If the theory of projective semantics of social 
relations is possible, then that fact points to the possibility and attainability of 
the innovation which the theory of social pulsation advocates. I am convinced 
that both approaches will serve as incentives for a generation of Bosnian phi-
losophers and sociologists who will not turn their gaze from the cold concep-
tual abstraction of theory (Adorno) nor from the incendiary concretion of 
Bosnian reality as it is given to us or as it could be.
One assemblage of conceptual determinants (anomalous causality, social 
syllogism, ontology of social facticity, anomalous inferentialism, projective seman-
tics of social relations, semantic transfer of causality, deontic syllogism, heterono-
mous intentionality, inferential social phenomenology, unstable ontology, impure/
unstable axioms, convergent conceptual strategies, parallel distributed redescription, 
conceptual demarcation of causality, logical and semantic necessity, convergent phe-
nomenologies, the transfer of social pulsations, the matrix of convergent causality, 
semantic transfer of causality, etc.), which emerged from the reception of Kom-
sic’s Theory of Social Pulsation, have their own “convergent etymology” in the 
works of Saul Kripke, Donald Davidson, John R. Searle, Robert Brandom, 
as well as Karl Marx, Max Weber, Anthony Giddens, David Harvey, Jürgen 
Habermas, Pierre Bourdieu, among others.
Komsic, as a philosopher and sociologist, a professor and a politician, has 
left the realm of sociology and trailed deep into the field of the social scienc-
es, emphasizing in particular the possibilities offered by the philosophy of so-
cial sciences. The courage to side with free and independent interpretations 
of old sociological questions, without subjugating oneself to authorities and 
the handing down of the content of sociological textbooks, has led him to 
the construction of a significant theory and an original scientific perspective. 
Whenever a scientific perspective is rationally articulated, it expresses an idea 
that should then be developed through argumentation by an application of 
method. The idea that social relations are social pulsations, that the actions 
of social actors are social pulsations, etc., is explicated in The Theory of Social 
Pulsation at an admirable, scientific level.
The future of the social sciences in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the fu-
ture of sociology in particular, depend on the reception of this approach. Kom-
sic’s Theory of Social Pulsation is a consistent work guided by the hypothesis 
of the social pulsation of actors, a work that does not contain contradictions 
and whose rebuttal, refutation, or criticism will unavoidable require the con-
struction of a wholly new innovative hypothesis. Introduced for the first time 
here, and stitched into the theory of social pulsation, the idea of the semantic 
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projection of social relations is a ladder by which the principles of Komsic’s the-
ory may be accessed. That ladder can lead down to reality, to the semantics of 
the concrete, onto the firm ground to which both theories refer, which would 
also be their greatest act and evidence of their “truthfulness.” We presume 
that this is one possibility of the communicational (academic) community 
within which there is interactive action, and not only autistic planning of the 
description of the past.
Notes
 1. Robert B. Brandom and Robert Nozick agree that an important instrument of this de-
marcation is rationality, or rather the rational nature of man, even though Brandom be-
lieves (in Making it Explicit) that it is simultaneously obligatory for practices and strategies, 
which are rationally determined, and thus normative. Nozick also believes that rationality 
completely determines man: “The capacity to be rational demarcates humans from oth-
er animals and thus defines them” The Nature of Rationality. Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, New Jersey, 1993, p. xi.
 2. See further the articleby N. Ibrulj: “The illumination of social ontology”, Sarajevo, Di-
jalog, 3–4, 2011, p. 239. In the same way Komsic grounded the presentationof his views 
in the books Survived Country (2006) and The Social Power of Mind (2012), connecting 
relevant critical reflexion onsociety and the semantics of the concrete in a case study.
 3. This “conceptual edifice” or “conceptual construct” (or “axiomatic grid”) which serves the 
axiomatisation of data inside any science is what David Hilbert named “das Fachwerk” 
in a lecture titled “Axiomatische Denken”. The lecture was given before the Swiss Mathe-
matical Society on September 11, 1917 in Zurich. It was first edited in Mathem. Annalen 
Vol. 78, pp. 405–415 (1918). The article was reprinted in D. Hilbert. Collected Essays 
(Gesammelte Abhandlungen), vol. 3, Berlin: Springer, 1935.
 4. Cf. Anthony Giddens: The Constitution of Society. Outline of the Theory of Structuration. 
Polity Press, Cambridge, 1986, p. xvii. Discussing the orthodox tradition of researching so-
cial phenomena, Giddens explains the significance of structuralism and post- structuralism 
for the modern approach, arguing that “they accord a fundamental role to language, and 
to cognitive faculties in the explication of social life. Language use is embedded in the 
concrete activities of day- to- day life and is in some sense partly constitutive of those ac-
tivities. Finally, the declining importance of empiricist philosophies of natural science is 
recognized to have profound implications for the social sciences also. It is not just the case 
that social and natural science are further apart than advocates of the orthodox consensus 
believed. We now see that a philosophy of natural science must take account of just those 
phenomena in which the new schools of social theory are interested – in particular, lan-
guage and the interpretation of meaning” (p. xvii).
 5. The indicated concepts are part of a conceptual framework contained in a work (Nijaz Ibrulj: 
Principles of Peojective Sociology: Connectionalist Theory of Society), still in preparation. It is 
based on lectures for doctoral studies in sociology at the Faculty of Philosophy in Sarajevo.
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 6. For more on this development, see: Andrew Schumann (ed.): Logic in Central and Eastern 
Europe: History, Science and Discourse. University Press of America, 2013. The reviewers 
of this edited collection are Noam Chomsky, Doy M. Gabby, and James Pettiefer. The 
collection features two extensive studies: Nijaz Ibrulj: National Dogmatism or the Logic of 
Consotiation? and Bosnia Porphyriana: An Outline of the Development of Logic in Bosnia and 
Hercegovina.
 7. See Nijaz Ibrulj: “The Map of Delusions of Bosniak Policy”, In: Muhamed Filipovic (ed.), 
The End of Bosniak Illusions: A Discussion of the Defeat of Bosniak Policy and the Responsibility 
for it. Sarajevo, 2014.
 8. Particularly pertinent to this topic is David Harvey’s book The New Imperialism. Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2003. Harvey deems imperative the analysis of global capital-
ism within which the new imperialism plays a key role. The chapter “All About Oil” is 
particularly relevant. For the content of the concept of neo- liberalisation, whose chief 
mechanism is “accumulation by dispossession,” see David Harvey: A Brief History of Neo-
liberalism. Oxford University Press, 2005, pp. 160–165.
 9. For instance, Pierre Bourdieu abandoned this dichotomy in favour of a reflexive relational 
foundation for the sociological perspective. Cf. Pierre Bourdieu and Loic J.D. Wacquant: 
An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology. Polity Press, 1992.
 10. The conceptual model of convergent social phenomenologies, which we here introduced 
into the theory of projective semantics of social relations because of the anomalous na-
ture of social causation, could be based on what Quine called the “convergence of in-
direct evidence“ which is produced by the comparison of different causations of similar 
social phenomena or by comparison of similar properties of different social phenome-
na. (W.V.O. Quine: “Posits and Reality.” u: Ways of Paradox and Other Essays. Random 
House, 1966, p. 233). Quine’s syntagm, „miscellaneous phenomena“, could be applied 
tothe social phenomena which may be in convergence when they are compared.
 11. Some of our intentions have a “standby” status (formal intentions) because the intended act 
or action is directed toward a nonexistent object of desire, hope, expectation, planning, 
premonition,… that is, the intended act or action is not achievable. Intentions which are 
directed to the objectively existent object and which are achievable could be named ma-
terial intentions. This is a distinction based on Brandom’s distinction between formal and 
material inference (Brandom 1994: 104).
 12. See Saul A. Kripke: Naming and Neccessity. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massa-
chusetts, Twelfth printing, 2001.
 13. Herbert Blumer best defines what the concept of symbolic interactionalism refers to, and 
with this significantly contributes to our argumentation for a theory of projective semantic 
social relations. Blumer writes: “The term ‘symbolic interaction’ refers, of course, to the pe-
culiar and distinctive character of interaction as it takes place between human beings. The 
peculiarity consists in the fact that human beings interpret or ‘define’ each other’s actions 
instead of merely reacting to each other’s actions. Their ‘response’ is not made directly to 
the actions of one another but instead is based on the meaning which they attach to such 
actions. Thus, human interaction is mediated by the use of symbols, by interpretation, 
or by ascertaining the meaning of one another’s actions. This mediation is equivalent to 
inserting a process of interpretation between stimulus and response in the case of human 
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behaviour.” Herbet Blumer: Symbolic Interactionism. University of California Press, 1969, 
pp. 78/79. Blumer argues that many sociologists and social theorists are responsible for 
formulating the view of society as symbolic interactionalism. He writes: “Among the for-
mer we may note such scholars as Charles Horton Cooley, W.I. Thomas, Robert E. Parks, 
E.W. Burgess, Florian Znaniecki, Ellsworth Faris, and James Mickel Williams. Among 
those outside the discipline we may note William James, John Dewey, and George Herbert 
Mead” (Ibid. 78).
 14. Kurt Gödel: On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia Mathematica and Related Sys-
tems. Dover Publications, New York, 1992.
 15. Cf. Alfred Tarski: Logic, Metamathematics, and Semantics. Hackett Publishing Company, 
Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1956, pp. 279–296. In the text “Some Observations on the 
Concepts of ω Consistency and ω Completness” Alfred Tarski explains common deduc-
tive systems that are consistent and complete but not omega (ω) consistent because they 
have expanded through consequences that emerge in metatheory, which means they are 
also not omega (ω) complete. We can say that social systems, in a given political system, 
are consistent (from the standpoint of political epistemology of that system’s represent-
atives) but that they are neither omega (completely, absolutely) consistent nor omega 
complete due to the consequences that emerge in their critical reflection in the political 
epistemology of their adversaries.
 16. Cf. Porphyrii. Sententiae ad Intelligibilia Ducents. Edidit B. Mommert. MCMVII. Lipsiae in 
aedibus B.G. Teubneri. XXXI (ΠΟΡФΥΡΙΟΥ ΑФΟΡΜΑΙ ΠΡΟΣ ΤΑ ΝΟΗΤΑ).
 17. See Lofty A. Zadeh: “The Role of Fuzzy Logic in the Management of Uncertainty in Ex-
pert Systems.” In: Kandel Gupta and Kiszka Bandler (eds.). Aproximate Reasoning in Expert 
Systems. Elsevier Science Publishers, North- Holand, 1985.
 18. Davidson did not consider the dependence of physical process of intention on the con-
text in which the intention is realized in such a way that one might claim, in the Witt-
gensteinian sense, that the notion/intention of a physical action is an intentional game/
communication (just as the use of a word is a linguistic game). It should also be added that 
the case where somebody raises his hand on the street and in this way votes for or against 
some law, that is raises his hand in parliament in order to hail a cab, is not likely even 
though possible. Intentional communication presupposes a semantic or communicational 
stereotype, it does not construct it each time anew. But recognizing intention again is always 
part of the practice of interpretation of speech and physical action. For the functioning of 
principles of the logical as an ideal matrix of identification/repeated recognition of logical 
principles, see Nijaz Ibrulj: Philosophy of Logic (Ch. IV: The Principle of the Logical), 
Sarajevo- Publishing, Sarajevo, 1999.
 19. The theory of social pulsations can be brought into analogy with string theory in physics, 
which has changed the relation towards the dimensions of space and time and the energet-
ic states of objects in them. How many dimensions anomalous causality has in the social 
context, how the causations of a single phenomenon transform and distribute towards 
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